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ABSTRACT: In this paper, the costs and benefits associated with postponing retirement are simulated in 
a standard simulation model for Belgium, using the approach of Stock and Wise (1990). Unlike earlier 
microsimulation-based applications of this approach, such as Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), this model 
does not take a representative sample as the point of departure, but simulates the costs and benefits of 
postponing retirement for four fictitious employees, representing male and female white- and blue-collar 
workers. While confirming conclusions drawn by other authors, this model allows for the separation of 
specific retirement schemes, and of the effect of different fiscal regimes for those retired and working. It 
is shown that differences between retirement schemes show up in differences in replacement rates and 
by whether or not the retirement benefit is a function of career length. Furthermore, advantageous fiscal 
regulations for the retired have a strong impact on the implicit costs of postponing retirement.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
As a result of structurally low fertility and ever-
increasing life expectancy, the Belgian population 
is ageing rapidly. The 2004 report of the 
‘Studiecommissie voor de Vergrijzing’ 
(Commission for the Study of Ageing) (High 
Council of Finances, 2004:20), estimates the 
budgetary cost of ageing to be 3.4% of GDP. It 
also concludes that an effective way to moderate 
costs would be to persuade individuals to 
postpone their retirement, as an increase by one 
year of the average age at which people retire 
would decrease the budgetary cost of ageing by 
0.9% of GDP.  In this, Belgium especially faces a 
challenge. Figure 1 shows the activity rate and 
effective retirement age of older employees in 
European countries.  
 
For the European Union as a whole, 38.8 % of 
those older than 55 still have a job. This 
percentage is 25.1 in Belgium, a figure lower only 
in Luxembourg. The effective age of retirement is 
59.9 in Europe as a whole, and 57 in Belgium. The  
 
 
Figure 1  Activity rate of 55-65 year olds, and effective retirement age in Europe (European Community, 
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European countries decided at the European 
Summit in Barcelona in 2002 that this effective 
retirement age should be increased by five years 
before 2010. This clearly is even more important 
for Belgium than for other countries. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an insight 
into what extent the current public retirement 
schemes for private-sector wage earners might 
encourage older workers to voluntarily leave the 
labour market and enter retirement. What is the 
penalty for continuing to work? And does this 
differ between workers of different categories, and 
between the two main public retirement schemes 
available in Belgium? These questions are to be 
answered exploiting the so-called option-value 
approach. The model to be presented in this paper 
is based on the notion of actuarial non-neutrality 
(OECD, 2003:4) of a retirement scheme, setting 
the gains from postponing retirement (extra 
salary) against the losses (foregone expected 
pension, for all future years until decease) 
associated with a specific retirement scheme. The 
paper will start by discussing the option-value 
approach to retirement. Next, the Micro-Economic 
Pension model (MEP) will be presented, after 
which its simulation results will be discussed at 
length. Finally, conclusions will be drawn. 
 
 
2. THE OPTION VALUE APPROACH 
 
The well-known replacement ratio compares the 
last-earned salary with the pension benefit one 
receives immediately after retirement.  This may 
not be the best variable to reflect a retirement 
decision, for two reasons. First, it is based on 
pension benefit in the first year after retirement, 
and ignores the future development of pension 
benefit conditional upon the year of retirement. 
Second, it suggests that working and retirement 
are two exchangeable strategies, i.e. that a retired 
individual can re-enter the labour market in any 
future year. Although this may be theoretically 
possible, in practise such behaviour is rare.   
Hence Duval (2003:34) describes retirement as an 
“absorbing rather than as a dynamic state”. 
 
The option value approach, developed by Stock 
and Wise (1990) supposes that a representative 
agent considers the gains and losses in utility 
pertaining to every year that he or she could 
retire. He or she weighs the utility of consumption 
(i.e. the higher income when working) against 
leisure (retirement). In this, he or she does not 
compare just the current alternative incomes, but 
the expected value of all current and future 
incomes. Define t as the first year that our 
individual has the institutional possibility to retire, 
and define r ≥t as the year that he or she retires. 
The flow of expected future utilities can then be 
written as: 
 
















t  the year of potential retirement  
r  the year of actual retirement  
s   future year, starting from either t or r 
ys  labour income or salary in year s 
bs(r)  pension income in year s, given retirement 
in r 
Uy  the utility of consumption 
Ub  the utility of leisure 
β  discount factor = 1/(1+discount rate) 
as  the probability of survival from t to s 
 
Given that r*= arg max(Vt(r)), it holds that Vt(r*)-
Vt(r) > 0 for each year that r*≠r. Considering all 
the future years that one can choose to retire (i.e. 
from  t to the year one reaches the mandatory 
retirement age), the option value in t is 
Gt(r*)=Vt(r*)-Vt(t), and one will postpone 
retirement from year t for as long as Gt(r*)>0. In 
r*, there is no additional expected utility from 
working, and one will therefore retire. Following 
Gruber and Wise (2004:26), the option value can 
be rewritten as 
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Option Value = discounted future wages       
        through  r* 
 
  +  discounted benefits       
               if retire at age r*  
 
  –  discounted benefits  
            if retire at age t 
  
          = (discounted future wages 
 through r*) 
  
 + [peak value] 
 
As defined the option value and peak value both 
assume that the older worker considers all years 
from t to the legal retirement age in one decision. 
One might, however, also want to consider year-
to-year decisions, in which one decides (not) to 
retire just for the year to come. This decision is 
reflected by some additional variables, closely 
related to the above option and peak value, which 
are to be presented now. First of all, Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) can be expressed as the 
flow of discounted expected utility from retirement 
in the year r, as seen from t:  
 







r r b U a SSW β                  (3) 
 
The change of SSW as a result of postponing 







r SSW SSW SSW 1 − − = ∆  .               (4) 
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retirement is postponed by one year, one 
renounces one year of pension benefits. However, 
depending on the scheme, the pension benefit 
may be a function of the career length, and 
postponing retirement then implies a higher 
benefit in the remaining years of retirement. If the 
two effects cancel each other out for an additional 
year of work, the system is said to be “actuarially 
neutral at the margin” (OECD, 2003:34). In 
practice, however, the first effect usually 
outweighs the second one (not least because of 
discounting), so usually ∆SSWr
t<0, in which case 
continuing to work comes with a loss in pension 
wealth (i.e. total post-retirement pension income). 
 
The  option value and peak value reflect a 
retirement decision to be taken about all the 
future years from t to the year one reaches the 
mandatory retirement age. The wealth accrual 
describes a year-to-year retirement decision, but 
considers only pension income and neglects labour 
income. One may therefore want to add variables 
that compare discounted salaries and pension 
incomes in a year-to-year-retirement decision.  
 
Write PR as the balance of discounted salaries and 
changes in pension wealth that result from 




r t y a SSW r PR
− + ∆ = β                (5) 
 
This variable is the balance of expected gains (one 
additional year of salary) and losses (a decrease 
of the stream of future pension benefits) if one 
postpones retirement in r. Income earned usually 
outweighs the negative wealth accrual, and 
therefore  PRt(r) is usually positive. Gains 
associated with continuing to work will often 
outweigh the losses, but we shall see that these 
increases in wealth as a result of continuing to 
work are (sometimes considerably) lower than the 
salary suggests. This may help to account for the 
fact that that a proportion of wage-earners 
chooses not to work but to retire instead. Note 
again the strong relation between the single- and 
multiple-year retirement decisions; PR and SSW 
are the single-year ‘versions’ of the option value 
and peak value. 
 
A second additional variable is used by the OECD 
(2003:34), Duval (2003:18), Börsch-Supan 
(2000:31) as well as Nelissen (2001:5) and is 
referred to as the ‘implicit tax on working through 
r’. For every year that retirement is postponed, 
the ratio of expected losses (renounced pension 
wealth) and gains (salary), shows that the former 














                 (6) 
 
Following the same line of reasoning explaining 
that PR usually is positive, one can expect itax to 
b e  u s u a l l y  p o s i t i v e  a s  w e l l .  I f  n o t ,  i t  i s  t o  b e  
interpreted as an implicit subsidy on work.  
 
3. A COMPARISON BETWEEN MEP AND 
EARLIER APPLICATIONS OF THE OPTION 
VALUE APPROACH 
  
The option value approach has been applied in 
several studies to date. The best known is that of 
Gruber and Wise (2004), in which the probability 
that one retires at a certain age is regressed on 
wealth accrual, peak value and option value. A 
similar study has been undertaken by Dellis et al. 
(2004:41) for Belgium.  The broad conclusion is 
that, even though the estimators of all variables 
are significant, wealth accrual has the highest 
explanatory value for both men and women. 
Subsequently these models have been used to 
simulate the effect of policy measures on the 
retirement probability. 
 
The OECD (OECD, 2003; Duval, 2003) also uses 
this approach to simulate and compare the 
actuarial nonneutrality of retirement schemes 
between countries. Their conclusion is that the 
implicit tax on continuing to work is low for 
workers of 55-years old, but increases 
considerably with age. Countries differ 
significantly, and these differences coincide with 
differences in replacement ratios. 
 
Similarly, Börsch-Supan (2000) explains labour 
market status (retired or working) using a 
regression model, including option value with 
gender, health, education, age and pension-type. 
This model is estimated on German data and the 
results were used to simulate the impact of 
actuarial changes in retirement benefits on 
retirement age. In later work, Berkel and Börsch-
Supan (2003) concentrate on institutional 
characteristics of the German retirement system, 
and simulate the effect of implementing a system 
of Notional Defined Contributions (NDC) on the 
effective retirement age. 
 
The above papers all present models which can be 
classified as static microsimulations (Van 
Mechelen and Verbist, 2005), for the calculation of 
the option values are made for a representative 
sample, and then regressed on the probability that 
an individual retires. This means that information 
on specific alternative retirement schemes are 
combined for existing individuals, and that the 
information on different individuals is combined in 
the estimation results. In contrast, the Micro-
Economic Pension model (MEP) to be presented in 
this paper may be classified as a standard model. 
As in a conventional microsimulation model, the 
point of departure is the individual; but a standard 
simulation model concentrates on the calculation 
of the various indicator variables for four fictional 
individuals representing male and female blue- 
and white-collar private-sector wage earners. It 
also includes two separate ‘first-pillar’ (state) 
retirement schemes – the early retirement 
scheme and a conventional early leavers’ scheme. 
Instead of aggregating outcomes across these 
schemes and types of individual, MEP keeps them 
separate, so that comparisons can be made as to 
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schemes with respect to male or female white- or 
blue-collar workers, and the degree to which these 
schemes may stimulate a step into retirement. 
Furthermore, an explicit goal of MEP is to bring to 
the fore the effect of different tax regimes on the 
implicit costs of continuing to work.  For this 
reason we follow the two OECD studies (OECD, 
2003; Duval, 2003) in expressing the variables 
presented above in monetary units rather than in 
terms of utility. The advantage of this approach is 
that it prevents the simulation results being 
determined to some degree simply by 
assumptions concerning the difference in utility 
between a salary or a pension benefit of one euro.  
Moreover, it is in line with the widely used 
replacement ratio, which is also a ratio of 
currency-units. Finally, MEP does not include a 
behavioural equation relating the option value 
variables with effective retirement probabilities. 
So, a higher (lower) implicit cost of retiring is 
assumed to encourage (discourage) retirement, 
but it is unknown by how much exactly.  
 
 
4. THE TWO BELGIAN STATE RETIREMENT 
SCHEMES  
 
The Belgian retirement system consists of three 
pillars. The first pillar is provided by public social 
security programs, which are the most important 
source of income for current pensioners. The 
second pillar is that of company pension schemes. 
Although coverage of these schemes is increasing 
rapidly, their importance in terms of the income 
they provide to current pensioners is still limited. 
The third pillar consists of individual life-
insurances and retirement savings. We 
concentrate upon the first-pillar social security 
retirement schemes. Ignoring disability schemes, 
older private-sector wage earners have two ways 
of retiring before the mandatory age of 
retirement. The first is via the system of early 
retirement (‘vervroegd rustpensioen’), and the 
second is via the conventional early leavers’ 
scheme (‘brugpensioen’) hereafter abbreviated to 
CELS. Both will be explained in broad lines in this 
section. 
   
The retirement system provides former private 
sector employees a pension benefit which 
essentially is a function of their past career. The 
mandatory age of retirement is 65 for males. For 
females it is gradually increasing from 61 years of 
age (from July 1997) via 63 years (from 2003 on) 
up to 65 (from 2009 on). Males become eligible 
for early retirement from the age of 60 on, if they 
have a minimum career service 35 years. For 
females, this minimum career length increased 
from 20 years in 1997 to 34 years in 2004, and is 
set to increase further, to 35 years, in 2009. 
Males and females can in principle therefore 
retire, and start to drawn public social security 
pensions, 5 and 3 years before the mandatory 
retirement age.  The remainder of this paper 
seeks to identify the implicit costs associated with 
working through to the mandatory retirement age 
rather than exercise the optional right to retire 
early. 
 
State pension benefit is calculated as  
 
Benefit = (.60 or .75) x (length of   career/length 
of career for full pension) x wage-base. 
 
The wage-base is essentially the sum of past 
salaries, indexed on the development of prices 
and with additional discretionary adjustments for 
the development of wages between the year of 
earning and the year of retirement. This modified 
sum of corrected salaries is then multiplied by the 
length of the career and divided by the length of 
the career needed for a full pension. The latter 
equals the age at which one becomes eligible to a 
full pension benefit minus 20. So, for males, it is 
65 – 20 = 45 years. For females, it is gradually 
increasing to 45 years. As a result, if one does not 
have a full career, continuing to work causes the 
pension benefit to move towards the ‘full-career 
pension benefit’. This wage-base is then multiplied 
by either 60% or 75%. If the individual is single, 
60% is used. If they have a partner, they can 
choose the ‘family pension benefit’ of 75%, but 
then their partner loses his or her own pension 
entitlement. In consequence, this choice is only 
beneficial if one’s partner has no significant 
revenues of his/her own. 
 
Redistributive solidarity is embedded in the 
pension system in several ways. First of all, the 
wage one earns in a certain year during one’s 
career is taken into account only up to a certain 
limit. All incomes higher than this limit do not add 
to the wage-base, and hence not to the future 
pension benefit. Those earning a higher income 
therefore face a lower replacement rate. Second, 
for those with a career of at least 15 years, the 
wage-base is calculated substituting a minimum 
annual allowance for periods of low earnings. 
Third, there is a minimum pension benefit 
guaranteed to all, modified for those without a full 
career history. 
 
An alternative to this system of early retirement is 
the conventional early leavers’ scheme, which is 
essentially an unemployment scheme. It allows 
older workers to exit the labour market and 
become unemployed on favourable terms until the 
mandatory retirement age. People generally 
become eligible for a CELS benefit from the age of 
58 onwards.  (In practice, many older workers 
retire to the CELS before the age of 60.  But these 
regulations are of an ad hoc nature and therefore 
not considered further in this paper.) The benefit 
consists of two parts. First, there is a general 
unemployment benefit which is equal to 60 % of 
the last wage up to a ceiling. Second, there is an 
additional benefit which equals 50% of the 
difference between the unemployment benefit and 
the last wage minus taxes and social-security 
benefits. The CELS benefit decreases relative to 
increasing income, because i) regular 
unemployment benefit is limited, and ii) the 
progressive tax-system causes net income to lag 
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Unlike early retirement benefit, the CELS benefit 
does not depend on the number of working years.  
Furthermore, when one enters the CELS, formally 
one does not retire but becomes unemployed. The 
career length, on which the future statue pension 
will  be  based   upon   reaching   the   mandatory 
retirement age, therefore continues to increase. 
Note that one may choose to work after 
retirement, but the additional income one may 
earn is very limited. Furthermore, returning to 
work from a situation of retirement is possible in 
theory, but rarely seen in practice. Finally, 
switching from the CELS to the early retirement 
scheme may be possible, but is not rational and 
therefore never done. Switching in the opposite 
direction is not possible.  
 
 
5. THE MICRO-ECONOMIC PENSION MODEL 
(MEP) 
 
The Micro-Economic Pensions model (MEP) 
evaluates equations 2 to 6 for fictitious individuals 
representing male and female white- and blue-
collar workers. The model is written in the SAS 
macro language and consists of a body of several 
modules, accompanied by two modules that read 
time-dependent parameters, such as gross wages, 
pensions, minimum and/or maximum benefit 
levels and wage-ceilings, tax and social 
contribution rates, survival probabilities, inflation 
rates, and so forth. Figure 2 shows the technical 
structure of the model. 
The discussion of the model starts in the top-left 
quadrant of Figure 2. The user needs to provide 
the model with information on the gender and 
labour market status of the fictitious individual, 
and whether or not he or she applies for a family 
pension benefit or a single-person pension benefit. 
Furthermore, one needs to provide a discount 
rate, and to decide whether results should be 
expressed in gross or net amounts. 
 
Using this information, MEP will for every year r≥ 
t that the individual is eligible to the pension 
benefit in question, calculate the flow of future 
expected pension benefits from all future years s 
until expected death, using the information 
available at r. All benefits are then discounted 
back to t using a discount rate and a survival 
probability. In the case of the CELS, the social 
security wealth  SSW will  sum  CELS  benefits up 
to the mandatory retirement age, and pension 
benefits afterwards. 
 
For the calculation of pension or CELS benefit, as 
well as the various indicators of actuarial non-
neutrality, one needs past and current gross-
incomes. The model includes a matrix containing 
wages per day for every combination of gender 
and labour market status, for all ages between 20 
and 64 and for all the years between 1955 and 






Figure 2 The structure of the Micro-Economic Pension model 
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For a thorough understanding of the model, two 
fundamental assumptions need to be discussed 
briefly. The first assumption pertains to the set of 
laws, rules and regulations on pensions, taxes and 
contributions that an individual faces in a certain 
year. In any year r, potential retirement benefits 
for all future years s are derived using information 
on laws, rules and regulations available at r. 
Suppose that an individual may choose to retire in 
2003. His potential pension benefit in the future 
year 2010 will be derived using information 
available in 2003. If he or she postpones 
retirement and reconsiders in 2004, then the 
potential pension in the same year 2010 will be 
calculated using the information available in 2004. 
The second assumption pertains to the individuals 
who form the basis of theMEP model. To keep 
things simple, especially with respect to fiscal laws 
and regulations, it is assumed that an individual is 
either single or the sole income earner in the 
household. In other words, the income of the 
individual is the only income of their household. A 
consequence of this is that a married individual 
will by definition choose the family pension benefit 
of 75% of the wage-base.  
 
Inputs to the model are based on information 
drawn from Put (various years) and Ministry of 
Finance (various years) and follow regulations on 
taxes, social contributions, pension benefits and 
CELS benefits for the years 1997-2004. It is 
assumed that the four typical employees are born 
in 1940 and enter the labour market at the age of 
20. Survival probabilities are derived from the 
2000 mortality rates (National Institute of 
Statistics and Federal Planning Bureau, 2003). 
Finally, and in accordance with Dellis et al. 
(2004:5) and Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003:3), 
the discount rate is set at 3 %. 
 
 
6. RESULTS  
 
6.1 Retirement  
Tables 1 to 4 below present the results for a single 
male or female white- or blue-collar worker. 
 
Table 1 presents the results for a single male 
white-collar worker. The year 2000 (at the age of 
60) is the first year in which he can choose to 
retire. If he continues to work through this year, 
his gross income will be 47,811 euro. If he 
decides to apply for a pension benefit, this gross 
benefit will amount to 15,763 euro. The second 
row contains this information if he decides to work 
through 2000 and reconsider retirement in 2001 
(i.e. at the age of 61). The ratio of alternative 
incomes, hereafter loosely called the replacement 
ratio, lies around 34%. That this is below 0.60, 
the fraction by which the pension base is 
multiplied to calculate the pension benefit, is 
caused by the fact that the pension benefit is 
based on the average (adjusted) wage over the 
length of the career, and given a maximum. 
Especially for male white-collar workers, the 
salary increases with age. The wage earned in the 
last year of the career is therefore higher than the 
average wage, and the ‘replacement ratio’ ends 
up well below 60%. The replacement ratio 
increasing with age is caused by the increasing 
career length, causing the pension benefit (the 
numerator) to increase, combined with the lower 
growth of the gross salary (the denominator). 
Finally, the net replacement ratio is 53% on 
average, and is higher than the gross replacement 
ratio. This is because of the progressiveness of the 
tax rate, and of a tax-exemption for retirees. This 
will be discussed further in section 6.3.1.   
 
Equation 1 shows Vr to be the expected 
discounted value of future benefits and salaries if 
the individual retires in r. When postponing 
retirement by one year, one roughly loses one 
year of pension benefits. The future pension 
benefits for the remaining years of retirement may 
however increase as a result of the longer career. 
One moreover gains a years’ salary. The gains 
outweigh the losses, so total wealth is maximized 
if one continues to work as long as possible, i.e. 
max(Vr)=V2004. The option value is therefore 
positive and becomes zero at r=2004. 
 
The peak value in the first row of Table 1 shows 
the difference in the flow of expected discounted 
benefits if one retires at the age of 60 compared 
to when one retires at that age where the option 
value is zero (i.e. at 64). The sooner one retires, 
the greater the flow of expected future benefits, 
meaning that the increase of future pension 
benefit as a result of continuing to work does not 
fully compensate for the lost pension year. The 
peak value will therefore be negative and zero at 
the age of 64. When only pension benefits are 
considered, one should of course retire as soon as 
possible. 
 
The three indicators to be discussed next consider 
a year-to-year retirement decision. The variable 
∆SSW reflects the loss in expected flow of pension 
benefits if retirement is postponed by one year. 
One can expect ∆SSW<0 for the same reason as 
for the peak value. Table 1 shows that this net 
loss of postponement is more than 5000 euro in 
the first year, and increasing. So there is reason 
to retire as soon as the possibility arises. 
However, one does not only lose when postponing 
retirement; one gains salary as well. The variable 
PRr shows the balance between the two 
alternatives. It again shows that the profit of 
postponing retirement decreases with age, 
especially between the first and second year. The 
last indicator itaxr shows the loss (the sum of lost 
future expected discounted pension benefits) as a 
fraction of the gain (salary). The advantage of this 
indicator is that it does not have a scale, and this 
will turn out to be convenient when the results are 
to be compared with those of other representative 
individuals. As PR is positive, itax will usually be 
positive as well, meaning that there is an implicit 
tax on working longer. In the first year, this 
implicit tax is almost 24%, but increases 
immediately to almost 33% in the second year. 
After that, the increase continues, albeit at a 






















































60  2000  40  47811  15763  0.330  0.519  59255  -28838        .         .        . 
61  2001  41  49534  16600 0.335 0.522 42918  -23449 -5390  17216 0.238 
62  2002  42  50758  17512 0.345 0.529 27929  -16110 -7339  14984 0.329 
63  2003  43  51565  18193  0.353  0.537  13094    -8680  -7429  14454  0.340 





















































60  2000  40  26260  11402  0.434  0.683  31744  -23272        .         .        . 
61  2001  41  27171  12057 0.444 0.690 21256  -20234 -3039  11000 0.216 
62  2002  42  27733  12801 0.462 0.704 12324  -15236 -4998      8844 0.361 
63  2003  43  28193  13029  0.462  0.702    6461    -7280  -7956    5712  0.582 





















































60  2000  40  22541  10833  0.481  0.734  23179  -24162        .       .        . 
61  2001  41  23205  11365 0.490 0.748 15894  -19531 -4631 7678 0.376 
62  2002  42  23489  11963 0.509 0.768 10245  -13093 -6438 5536 0.538 
63  2003  43  23832  12395  0.520  0.771    4972    -6662  -6431  5296  0.548 





















































60  2000  40  13662  8187  0.599  0.785  19236  -13706          .         .         . 
61  2001  41  14056  8856  0.630  0.828    9189  -15512     1806  10302  -0.213 
62  2002  42  14285  9438  0.661  0.861    4466  -11856    -3656    4642   0.441 
63  2003  43  14475  9438  0.652  0.831    6707    -1405  -10451   -2299   1.282 
64  2004  44  14682  9992  0.681  0.873         0          0    -1405    6563   0.176 
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retirement is encouraged, and that implicit taxes 
increase with age. 
 
Comparing Table 1 with Tables 2 (female white-
collar workers) and 3 (male blue-collar workers) 
reveals that both the gross and net replacement 
rate are inversely related to income. There are 
two explanations for this. First, the increase of 
wage with age is higher for male white-collar 
workers than for female white-collar workers and 
blue-collar workers (see appendix). The average 
income will therefore be further below the last 
wage for the first category compared to the last 
two, and hence the difference in the replacement 
ratio. Second, as male white-collar workers have 
the highest income, the effect of the upper wage 
limit in the calculation of the wage-base (and 
therefore the pension) is more important, causing 
the replacement rate to be lower. 
 
Compared to the figures in Table 1, incomes, 
profits and losses of postponing retirement, and 
therefore the indicators, are all lower in Tables 2 
and 3. In contrast the implicit tax rate itax has no 
scale. Two effects explain the change of the 
implicit tax rate between categories of employees. 
The first, relating to the change of itax between 
male blue- and white-collar workers, is that the 
implicit tax rate increases with the replacement 
ratio (cf. Börsch-Supan, 2000:131; Duval, 
2003:33). The second, relating to the difference 
between male and female white-collar workers, is 
that the loss associated with postponing 
retirement is especially high for females. This is 
because the length of career required for a full 
pension benefit is shorter for women than for 
men, although increasing over time. As the year 
of entering the labour market is assumed to be 
the same for all typical individuals whose 
simulations are discussed, female employees 
reach a full pension before males. If full career is 
reached, postponing retirement no longer results 
in an increase in the pension benefit for the 
remaining retirement years. The profit associated 
with postponing retirement therefore decreases, 
and the implicit tax increases. 
 
The results for female blue-collar workers are 
discussed separately. With the employee-types 
discussed so far, the loss of one year of pension 
benefits as a result of postponing retirement 
outweighed the gain in the higher pension benefit 
in the remaining years. As a result ∆SSW was 
negative, and itax was therefore positive as well. 
In the case of female blue-collar workers, this is 
no longer the case, as their pension benefit is not 
a function of the wage, but of the minimum 
pension benefit set by law. The effect of 
postponing retirement is therefore determined by 
the development of this minimum pension over 
time. If a female blue-collar worker postpones 
retirement from 2000 to 2001, the minimum 
pension benefit given a full career will have gone 
up considerably. Moreover, the woman does not 
have a full career and the effective minimum 
benefit level is decreased pro rata temporis. 
Postponing retirement therefore results in the 
effective minimum pension benefit increasing even 
further. This causes the profit of postponement to 
outweigh the loss, and thus results in an implicit 
subsidy (a negative implicit tax) on labour of 
21%.  In later years, the situation is back to 
normal in that itax>0. This is because of the lower 
increase of the minimum pension benefit over 
time, combined with the fact that the woman has 
reached full career. The conclusion therefore is 
that it is profitable for blue-collar females to 
continue to work between 2000 and 2001, but 
highly costly afterwards.  
 
6.2 CELS benefit 
Tables 5 to 8 contain the simulation results of the 
CELS benefit for the four types of employee 
discussed in this paper. 
 
The CELS benefit is a function of the wage earned 
in the last year of the career, and not of the 
average wage. Moreover, the CELS benefit is 
subject to a higher wage ceiling than the pension 
benefit. The replacement ratio of the CELS benefit 
therefore exceeds that of the pension benefit. 
Consider an individual, say a male white-collar 
worker at the age of 60, who has the choice 
between a pension (the first line in Table 1) and a 
CELS benefit (the third line in Table 5). The gross 
income of course is the same in both cases, 
namely 47,811 euro, but the gross benefits are 
not: the pension benefit is 15,763 euro, whereas 
the CELS benefit amounts to 25,773 euro. But 
there is more; if one applies for the latter benefit, 
one does not retire but becomes unemployed. 
Pensionable career length will therefore continue 
to increase, and one will at 65 become eligible to 
a pension benefit of 18,856 euro. Clearly, when 
given the choice, one will always choose to enter 
the CELS over the retirement scheme. In practice, 
many older workers enter the CELS as a result of 
company restructuring. These people obviously do 
not have the choice between working and retiring. 
But even then does it remain advantageous to 
choose the CELS over the pension scheme. 
 
When  considering the implicit tax on working 
longer,  itax, it immediately becomes clear that 
this is much higher for the CELS than for the old-
age pension scheme. For the four categories of 
employees, the average net itax is 87% 
(0.784/0.422) higher for the former than for the 
latter. The first and most obvious reason for this is 
that the former benefit is higher than the latter, 
both before and after retirement. This is only part 
of the explanation though, for the average 
replacement ratio for the four workers is ‘only’ 
16% higher for the CELS benefit than the pension 
benefit. The second reason is that the CELS 
benefit is not affected by length of career. 
Postponing retirement, in contrast, only results in 
a loss of benefits, whilst the expected benefit to 
be received during the remaining future years 
does not change. 
 
Before turning to a discussion of simulation 
variants, let us once again take a closer look at 
the female blue-collar worker. For the other DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      18 





















































58 1998  38 44546  24138  18856  0.542  0.708  52268  -74371          .       .        . 
59 1999  39 45680  24704  18856  0.541 0.704  46317  -59835  -14536  6366  0.696 
60 2000  40 47811  25773  18856  0.539 0.699  38397  -47241  -12593  8331  0.602 
61 2001  41 49534  26646  18856  0.538 0.696  28432  -35566  -11676  9234  0.558 
62 2002  42 50758  27317  18856  0.538 0.694  19486  -22632  -12933  7715  0.626 
63 2003  43 51565  27794  18856  0.539 0.694  10414  -10276  -12356  7886  0.610 
64 2004  44 52512  28527  18856  0.543  0.698         0          0  -10276  9400  0.522 
 
 





















































58  1998  38  24864  14296  13348  0.575  0.807  26046  -53426          .       .        . 
59 1999  39 25360  14545  13371  0.574  0.802  23575 -42988 -10438  2677 0.796 
60 2000  40 26260  14998  13401  0.571  0.797  19485 -34200     -8787  4290 0.672 
61 2001  41 27171  15464  13411  0.569  0.792  14065 -36355     -7946  5163 0.606 
62  2002  42  27733  15804  13413  0.570  0.791    9698  -16871    -9384  3541  0.726 
63  2003  43  28193  16108  13413  0.571  0.792    4787    -8420    -8451  4312  0.662 
64  2004  44  28664  16603  13405  0.579  0.800         0          0    -8420  4072  0.674 
 
 





















































58  1998  38  21883  13377  12851  0.611  0.855  16070  -52090          .        .        . 
59 1999  39 22113  13445  12852  0.608  0.851  14868 -41673 -10417  1297 0.889 
60 2000  40 22541  13707  12851  0.608  0.850  12369 -32815     -8858  2618 0.772 
61  2001  41  23205  13971  12852  0.602  0.843    8913  -24901    -7914  3472  0.695 
62  2002  42  23489  14266  12846  0.607  0.846    6104  -15992    -8909  2166  0.804 
63  2003  43  23832  14613  12844  0.613  0.848    3054    -7985    -8007  2841  0.738 
64  2004  44  24128  15243  12840  0.632  0.866         0          0    -7985  2516  0.760 
 
 





















































58 1998  38 13155      9624  9992  0.732  0.938        0       0         .         .        . 
59 1999  39 13564      9878  9992  0.728  0.943    516   8497  -8497    -332  1.041 
60 2000  40 13662      9966  9992  0.729  0.941    971  17026  -8529    -562  1.071 
61 2001  41 14056  10256  9992  0.730  0.941    833  24669  -7643     290  0.964 
62 2002  42 14285  10474  9992  0.733 0.934 2199  34208  -9539 -1791  1.231 
63 2003  43 14475  10693  9992  0.739 0.925 3488  43365  -9157 -1545  1.203 
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worker types considered, the salary earned when 
postponing retirement was larger than the pension 
benefit lost.  However, the salary of female blue-
collar workers is low. Moreover, due to the 
minimum unemployment benefit level and the fact 
that the additional benefit is a function of the 
difference between this benefit and net income, 
the total gross CELS benefit is relatively high, and 
the loss of postponing (in net amounts) outweighs 
the gain. The PR therefore is often negative or 
positive but very small, and the option value is 
zero in the first year. In stark contrast to the 
other types of employees, the female blue-collar 
worker actually loses wealth when she continues 
to work, and the average after-tax implicit tax on 
working longer is higher than 1. 
 
6.3 Simulation variants 
The previous section discussed the considerable 
costs associated with delaying retirement. For 
pension benefits, these costs are generally higher 
for females than for males, and higher for blue-
collar worker than for white-collar workers (with 
the exception of female blue-collar workers). For 
the CELS benefit, the results are more alike 
between the four categories, and the implicit 
taxes generally are higher. These results are 
based upon after-tax indicators of the cost of 
postponing retirement for single employees, who 
enter the labour market at the age of 20. How do 
these findings change when (i) before-tax 
indicators are calculated; (ii) the individual is no 
longer single, but has a partner without any 
income of their own; (iii) the individual has 
experienced a shorter career at the moment of 
becoming eligible to any benefit; (iv) changes are 
made to the rules for the calculation of the 
pension benefit, CELS benefit and the systems of 
social contributions and taxes.  To facilitate 
discussion of these questions, Tables 9 and 10 do 
not contain the year-to-year simulation results, 
but these results averaged over all decision years 
r. For example, the top-left quadrant of Table 9 
contains the averages of Table 1. To further 
facilitate discussion, Table 9 introduces the 
variablex ,  which is simply the mean of the row 
variable over the four columns. So, x is either the 
mean value of the replacement ratio or itax over 
the four categories of workers, depending on the 
row of the value of x .  The following sub-sections 
use this information to address in turn each of 
questions (i)-(iv) above. 
 
 
     Table 9  Simulation variants: average pension and CELS benefits over all choice years r 
 
Net benefits 
 (after taxes and social contributions) 
 
Gross benefits  
(before taxes and social contributions) 
  white-collar blue-collar   white-collar blue-collar  
  male female male Female  x     male female male female  x  
  Single (section 6.3.1) 
 Pension  benefit 
Rep. ratio 0.530 0.698 0.762 0.835  0.706   0.344 0.454 0.506 0.645  0.487 
∆SSW  -7210 -5818 -6041 -3426     -9476 -6789 -6889 -3406   
PR  14811    7913    5800    4802      36598  18799  14457  9760   
Itax  0.329 0.426 0.512 0.422  0.422   0.207 0.268 0.324 0.263  0.265 
  CELS benefit 
Rep. ratio 0.699 0.797 0.851 0.935  0.820   0.540 0.573 0.612 0.733  0.614 
∆SSW  -12395 -8904 -8682 -8339      -21530  -13110  -12259 -9060   
PR  8155 4009 2485 -528      21579  10990 7925 3447   
Itax  0.603 0.689 0.777 1.068  0.784   0.499 0.544 0.607 0.725  0.593 
  With partner without income of his or her own (section 6.3.2) 
  Pension benefit 
Rep. ratio 0.645 0.731 0.775 0.900  0.763   0.430 0.567 0.633 0.805  0.609 
∆SSW  16213  -10912 -9498 -4429      -11845 -8486 -8611 -4257   
PR  9534 6036 5301 5318      34229  17102  12735 8909   
Itax  0.650 0.677 0.663 0.476  0.617   0.258 0.335 0.406 0.329  0.332 
  CELS benefit 
Rep. ratio 0.764 0.798 0.811 0.853  0.806   0.577 0.640 0.688 0.796  0.675 
∆SSW  -19372 -14634 -13257 -10021    -23646 -15059 -14190 -10118   
PR  4781 1507  951 -650      19463 9041 5994 2389   
Itax  0.816 0.925 0.950 1.075  0.941   0.548 0.625 0.703 0.810  0.672 
  Single, after a five-year shorter career (section 6.3.3) 
  Pension benefit 
Rep. ratio 0.511 0.652 0.698 0.731  0.648   0.326 0.420 0.467 0.571  0.446 
∆SSW  -6766 -4787 -5453 -1969     -8490 -4977 -6037 -1690   
PR  15255 8944 6387 6259      37584  20611  15309  11476   
Itax  0.309 0.350 0.463 0.241  0.341   0.185 0.196 0.284 0.130  0.199 DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      21 
6.3.1 Simulation results before-tax and social 
contributions   
How can we expect the results from sections 6.1 
and 6.2 to change when expressed in gross 
amounts? In other words, can we disentangle the 
effect of the tax system from the effect of the 
retirement system itself? First of all, let us take a 
brief look at the system of taxes and contributions 
in Belgium. Whereas social security social 
contributions for employees amount to 13.07% of 
gross income, this equivalent is 3.55% for 
pensioners unless the resulting taxable income 
drops below a minimum. For those receiving CELS 
benefits, the social contributions are 3.5% plus 
3%, each conditional upon receipt of the same 
minimum level of taxable income. Moreover, tax 
rates increase by income band, so that the tax 
system by itself is progressive. In addition, those 
receiving a non-salary income (including a pension 
or a CELS benefit) are granted an additional tax 
exemption which, for example, equals 1612 euro 
for singles in 2003. All in all, those who are retired 
are subject to a favourable regime of taxes and 
social contributions.  The relative gain from 
working over retirement therefore decreases, 
when expressed as an after-tax amount.  Or, to 
put it another way, expressing the simulation 
results in gross instead of net amounts should 
result in the costs of postponing retirement to 
decrease. This is confirmed by Table 9. For the 
pension benefit, the average itax over the four 
categories of workers is 0.265 before taxes and 
0.422 after taxes, giving a net implicit tax on 
working longer.  The causes of this implicit tax can 
be sub-divided into a ‘gross benefit effect’ and a 
‘tax effect’.  The gross benefit effect, being the 
direct result of the pension scheme itself, accounts 
for 0.265/0.422 or 63% of the overall net implicit 
tax, with the reaming 37%, attributable to ‘tax 
effect’ of the state system of social contribution 
and taxation. For the CELS the contribution of the 
gross benefit effect to the overall net implicit tax 
is 0.593/0.789, or 76%, leaving 24% to be 
accounted for by the ‘tax effect’. 
 
6.3.2 Family versus single-beneficiary pension 
benefit 
When applying for a pension benefit, a single 
individual will receive a pension benefit equal to 
60% of their wage-base, given a full career. If 
one’s partner has no or limited revenues of his or 
her own, one can choose the ‘family pension 
benefit’ of 75 % of the wage-base. Also the 
minimum pension benefit increases by 25%. How 
does this change the above results? Is the implicit 
tax of working longer higher for those receiving a 
family pension benefit as compared to those 
receiving a single-beneficiary pension benefit? Of 
course, the average gross replacement rate of the 
pension benefit increases by 25% from 0.487 to 
0.609. Likewise, the before-tax cost of postponing 
retirement increases: the average itax for the four 
types of employees increases by 25% as well, 
from 0.487 to 0.609.  Similarly, one can expect 
the CELS benefit to increase, though not by as 
much as 25%. The general unemployment benefit 
(the first part of the CELS benefit) does not 
change. However, the fact that one is financially 
responsible for a partner without any income of 
his or her own has important fiscal consequences. 
In this case, 30% of one’s income is taxed as if it 
were the income of the partner. As the tax system 
is progressive, this implies a reduction of the tax 
burden compared to a single individual. The net 
income that is the basis of the additional part of 
the CELS benefit increases, and so does the 
additional part of the CELS benefit. The average 
replacement ratio of the CELS benefit therefore 
increases, albeit only by 10% (from 0.614 to 
0.657). The increase of itax is more important, 
namely 13% (from 0.593 to 0.672). This 
difference is caused by the fact that the implicit 
tax increases not only as a result of the increasing 
CELS benefit, but also of the increasing future 
expected pension benefit which the individual will 
receive after reaching the retirement age. The 
pattern of changes is comparable when 
considering after-tax amounts, though all changes 
are considerably smaller than the changes in 
before-tax amounts. This is because the increase 
of the gross amounts is partially taxed away by 
the progressive tax scheme.   
 
6.3.3 A shorter career  
So far it has been assumed that each individual 
enters the labour  market at the age of 20 in 
1960, and therefore chooses to retire (at the age 
of 58 or 60) after a career of 38 (CELS) or 40 
(pension) years. In this section, the impact of a 
later entry date is considered. Changing the 
length of the  career has no effect on the CELS 
benefit, and a limited effect on the implicit tax of 
this scheme. For the pension scheme, one may 
expect both the replacement ratio and the implicit 
tax on working longer to decrease. Table 9 
contains the simulation results when somebody 
enters the labour market at the age of 25 and 
therefore becomes eligible for retirement after a 
career of 35 years instead of 40. The average 
gross and net replacement ratios decrease by 
8.5% (0.446/0.487) and 8.3% (0.680/0.706). 
Gross and net itax decrease by 25% 
(0.199/0.265) and 19.3% (0.341/0.422).  Why is 
the decrease of the latter so much stronger? This 
is because the pension benefit increases career 
length. An increase in career length of one year is 
more important in relative terms when one has a 
career of 35 years than 40 years. The relative 
increase of the pension benefit will therefore be 
more important, and the cost of postponing 
retirement will be lower. The conclusion, 
consequently, is that a shorter career comes with 
a lower implicit tax on working longer. 
 
6.3.4 Some technical variants  
In this final section of results, the effect of 
changes to the rules and regulations for 
calculating the pension benefit, CELS benefit and 
taxation will be introduced and discussed briefly. 
The goal is to further demonstrate the simulation 
possibilities of the model and to show the effect of 
possible policy measures on the implicit tax of 
working longer. For a more elaborate discussion of 
these technical variants, see Dekkers (2005). DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      22 
Table 10 contains the simulation results for these 
variants. 
  
6.3.4.1 An increase of the career equirement  
In a first technical variant, consider what would 
happen if the career required for a full pension 
benefit were to be increased by one year. The 
number of years that one should work in order to 
get a full pension would increase from 45 to 46 
years for males, from 40 to 41 years for females 
joining a scheme before 2001, and so on. This 
clearly has no effect on the CELS benefit, and only 
a limited effect on the implicit cost of postponing 
CELS. The discussion will therefore be limited to 
the implications for the pension benefit. One can 
expect both the replacement rate and the implicit 
tax on working longer to decrease. Table 10 
shows that this indeed is the case, although the 
changes are limited. When taking the average 
over the four categories of employees, the gross 
replacement ratio decreases by 1.85%, from 
0.487 to 0.478. The net replacement ratio also 
decreases, by 1.70%, from 0.706 to 0.694. The 
gross and net average implicit tax on postponing 
retirement respectively decrease by 12.35% (from 
0.265 to 0.233) and 9.07% (from 0.422 to 
0.384). Changing the required career has a 
stronger effect on itax than on the replacement 
rate, analogous to the results in the previous 
section. But the explanation is not the same. As 
the required career length increases, workers 
reach full career in a later year than before. 
Postponing retirement therefore has a greater 
effect on the pension benefit for all future years, 
and the gain of delaying retirement therefore 
increases, meaning that itax decreases. 
 
6.3.4.2 A simultaneous change in the system of 
taxes and contributions, and the minimum 
pension benefit  
A second technical variant introduces a 
simultaneous change of the system of taxes and 
social contributions, and of the minimum pension 
benefit. As explained in section 6.3.1, those 
retired benefit from an additional tax exemption, 
which decreases their effective tax rate relative to 
workers. Now suppose that this tax deduction is 
abolished for both pensioners and CELS 
beneficiaries. At the same time, the minimum 
pension benefit is increased by 20%. 
 
The higher taxes to be paid over the  future 
pension benefit results in a decrease of both the 
average net replacement rate (by 8.17 %, from 
0.706 to 0.649) and itax (by 11.29 %, from 0.422 
to 0.375) over the four categories of workers.
 
 
Table 10  The effect of technical variants on the cost of postponing retirement: simulation variants 
for single workers: averages over all choice years r 
 
 
Net benefits (after taxes and social 
contributions) 
 
Gross benefits (before taxes and social 
contributions) 
 white-collar  blue-collar      white-collar  blue-collar   
 male  female  male  female  x    male female  male female  x  
  Variant 1: Increase career length required for full pension entitlement (section 6.4.3.1) 
 Pension  benefit 
Rep. ratio  0.523  0.690  0.746  0.818 0.694   0.337  0.447  0.497  0.633 0.478 
∆SSW -7106  -5351  -5916  -2604     -9242  -5855  -6701  -2388  
PR  14915  8381  5925  5624     36832  19732  14646  10778  
Itax  0.324  0.391  0.502  0.319 0.384   0.202  0.230  0.316  0.183 0.233 
 
Variant 2: Abolish post-retirement tax exemption + increase minimum pension 
benefit (section 6.4.3.2) 
  Pension benefit 
Rep. ratio  0.464  0.591  0.647  0.893 0.649   0.344  0.454  0.506  0.773 0.520 
∆SSW -6136  -4842  -5056  -3537     -9476  -6789  -6889  -4087  
PR  15885  8890  6784  4691     36598  18799  14457  9079  
Itax  0.280  0.355  0.429  0.435 0.375   0.207  0.268  0.324  0.316 0.279 
  CELS benefit 
Rep. ratio  0.646  0.689  0.729  0.835 0.714   0.540  0.573  0.612  0.733 0.614 
∆SSW -11712  -7879  -7605  -7783      -21530 
-
13110 
-12259 -9331   
PR  8838  5034  3562  28     21579  10990  7925  3176  
Itax  0.569  0.610  0.680  0.996 0.784   0.499  0.544  0.607  0.747 0.599 
 
Variant 3: Equalise social contribution rate for CELS and pension beneficiaries 
(section 6.4.3.3) 
  CELS benefit 
Rep. ratio  0.666  0.761  0.812  0.862 0.775   0.540  0.573  0.612  0.733 0.614 
∆SSW -11847  -8522  -8310  -7833      -21530 
-
13110 
-12259 -9060   
PR  8703  4392  2857  -22     21579  10990  7925  3447  
Itax  0.576  0.660  0.744  1.00 0.746   0.499  0.544  0.607  0.725 0.593 DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      22 
However, the results differ strongly between the 
categories of workers. For the pension scheme 
and for workers other than female blue-collar 
workers, the decrease of the net replacement   
ratio is comparable, and lies between 12.4 and 
15.3%. The decrease of the implicit tax on 
postponing retirement lies between 14.9 and 
16.7%. The results are different only for female 
blue-collar workers, as their pension benefit level 
is determined by the designated minimum benefit 
level. As a result, the higher contribution rate is 
accompanied by an increase of their gross pension 
benefit by 20%. As might be expected, the latter 
is more important than the former, so their net 
replacement ratio and itax increase by 6.9 and 
3.06%. 
 
For the CELS benefit, only the loss of the tax 
exemption has an effect on the net replacement 
ratio. The average net replacement ratio 
decreases by 8.96% (from 0.784 to 0.714). For all 
employee-categories but the female blue-collar 
worker,  itax will decrease between 5.5% and 
12.39%. The increasing minimum pension benefit 
of female blue-collar workers will only become 
effective once they reach the retirement age. As 
this future value is discounted and corrected for 
the survival rate, the positive effect of this 
increase on itax is not strong enough to 
compensate for the decreasing effect of the higher 
social contributions. The itax therefore decreases 
by 6.76% for female blue-collar workers. 
 
6.3.4.3 A change in the social contribution rate for 
CELS beneficiaries 
In a third and final technical variant, the 
advantageous social contribution rate is abolished 
for CELS beneficiaries, but maintained for pension 
beneficiaries. CELS beneficiaries now face the 
same social contribution rate as workers, and only 
pensioners have a lower social contribution rate. 
The result is that nothing changes for the pension 
beneficiaries whilst the gross replacement rate 
and itax remains the same for the CELS benefit. 
The only change is that the net replacement rate 
and net itax decrease for the latter, as the social 
contributions which have to be paid on the gross 
benefit increase. The average net replacement 
ratio for the four types of employees decreases by 
5.54% from 0.820 to 0.775, and the net implicit 
tax on postponing retirement decreases by 4.88% 
from 0.784 to 0.746. The increase of the net itax 
relative to its gross value is now limited and this 
fiscal measure therefore decreases the 
attractiveness of the CELS benefit relative to the 
pension benefit.  In the base-variant, the average 
net implicit tax rate was almost 86% (0.784 to 
0.422) higher for the former than for the latter. 






One of the possible solutions to limiting the 
budgetary consequences of demographic ageing is 
to increase the activity rate of older workers in 
Europe. Acknowledging the fact that retirement is 
an absorptive state from which few or none 
return, a Micro-Economic Pension Model (MEP) 
expresses the costs of postponing retirement by 
one or more years, both before and after taxes 
and social contributions, and this for two early-
retirement schemes: the pension scheme and the 
CELS.  
 
The main conclusion is that the gains from 
continuing to work in most cases outweigh the 
losses, so that working longer causes total wealth 
to increase. However, the implicit costs associated 
with postponing retirement are in some cases 
considerable. They may be limited for the gross 
pension benefit, but they increase considerably 
when net amounts are simulated. Furthermore, 
the costs associated with postponing retirement 
are systematically higher for the CELS benefit 
than for the pension benefit, and this difference is 
only partially explained by the higher CELS benefit 
relative to the pension benefit. The higher costs 
associated with working longer are more 
endogenous to the CELS-system and to a lesser 
extent caused by the fiscal inequality between 
workers and retirees. 
   
The model has also considered the impact of 
alternative worker characteristics: singles versus 
those with a no income partner; longer versus 
shorter careers. As might be expected, the effect 
of these different characteristics is more important 
in the case of the pension benefit.  It also comes 
as no surprise that the cost of postponing 
retirement is lower if one has a shorter career, 
although the magnitude of this difference is 
remarkable. 
 
Furthermore, several changes to the rules and 
regulations for the pension benefit, CELS benefit 
and tax and contribution regime have been 
simulated.  This was done not so much to suggest 
policy measures, as to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the model. This exercise clearly 
shows that different measures have different 
effects, not only upon the four types of workers as 
a whole, but also between male and female and 
white- and blue-collar workers. Policy measures 
designed to increase the activity rate among older 
workers, should take these differences into 
account. 
 
Finally, by virtue of being able to disaggregate 
impacts in this way, the fact that MEP is a 
standard simulation model and not a genuine 
microsimulation model is arguably an advantage.  
But there are also disadvantages. How 
representative are the results for the population of 
older workers? Are the differences between 
categories of workers statistically significant? And 
by how much will the employment rate of older 
workers change as a result of a policy change? All 
these questions cannot be answered at this stage, 
as they require MEP to be based on a 
representative dataset of ‘real’ individuals, and 
not upon a limited selection of fictitious agents.  A 
useful line of future enquiry, therefore, would be DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      23 
to combine MEP outputs with a static 
microsimulation model to generate representative 
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APPENDIX:  THE ESTIMATION OF WAGE 
MATRICES 
 
The calculation of the pension and CELS benefit is 
based on the income an individual made 
throughout his or her career. Since the model 
simulates retirement benefits of male and female 
white- and blue-collar workers, we ideally need 
category-specific datasets containing b
t
age, the 
wage per day, spanning all of the years, t, that 
the workers were of age between 20 and 65. As 
this is not available, it has been necessary to 
construct such wage rate datsets for four fictitious 
individuals, one in each category. This has been 
achieved using the following information:  
 
1. The total gross wage mass and total working 
days from the centralized statistics of the 
“Rijksdienst Sociale Zekerheid” or RSZ; 
quarterly data available from the first quarter 
of 1976 (cf. Bresseleers and Hendrickx, 2003a, 
b). 
2. Long-term time series of gross-wages and 
employment, available from 1953 (cf. 
Hendrickx, 2001).  DEKKERS     The financial implications of working longer      24 
3. Individual information from the “Loon- en 
arbeidstijdengegevensbank” of the RSZ; 
quarterly data available from the first quarter 
of 1997 to the last quarter of 2000. 
4. Employment figures for blue-collar orkers, 
white-collar workers and civil servants, 
specified to gender and age (5 year groups) 
from the “Enquete arbeidskrachten” of the 
National Institute of Statistics, available for the 
years between 1986 and 2003.  
5. Population statistics on age and gender and 
population averages, from the National 
Institute of Statistics, available from 1948 
onward.  
 
First of all, using data source (1), the 
macroeconomic wage per day w
t in the year t was 
derived for the four categories of workers. This 
was extrapolated from 1976 back to 1955 using 
(2). Figure A1 shows this general wage per day 
for the four categories of workers. 
 
Starting with this w
t, we use a simple model to 
derive w
t
age, the wage per day of an individual of a 
certain age in year t. We use the fact that the 
macroeconomic wage per day is a weighted 
average of the unknown w
t
age for every age group 
at t, where the weight is the proportional number 
of workers of every age group (4; and 5 for the 






















20                (A1) 
 
holds for every category of worker, where N
t
age is 
the number of workers in the age group age.  At 
the same time the proportional size of the group 
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64 and we therefore need 
additional information to solve this model.  This is 
provided by data source (3).  Suppose a relation 
f(.) between the gross wage per day at a certain 
age, and the gross wage per day at a reference 
age, say 20, and suppose that this relation is the 
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Substitution results in 
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The remaining unknown is w
t


































Figure A1  Wage per day for the categories of workers as a whole
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Now all that is left do is to estimate a wage profile 
f(.), separately for each category of worker, which 
relates the wage per day of an individual in that 
category aged age to that of a 20 year old.  This 
has been done using simple quadratic regression 
on wage data from the 3
rd quarter of 1998, again 
using data source (3).  Figure A2 contains the 
resulting wage profiles. 
 
As might be expected, both male and female blue 
collar workers have a less steep wage profile than 
white collar workers.  Furthermore, the wage per 
day of young male blue-collar workers is higher 
than that of white-collar workers, both male and 
female; and although the wage of female white-
collar workers catches up rapidly at first, it only 
ends up slightly higher than that of male blue-
collar workers from the age of 40 on. 
 
To summarize, the growth of individual wages 
between two years, t and t+1 (and, therefore, 
between  age and age+1) is determined by the 
growth rate of the macroeconomic wage w
t 
(Figure A1), whereas the wage difference between 
two individuals of different age at t is determined 





Figure A2  Logarithm of the gross wage per day as a function of age 